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WORLD INTEGRATION, COMPETITIVE AND BARGAINING REGIMES SWITCH: AN EXPLORATION
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of an endogenous switch from a competitive to a bargaining
international equilibrium. We consider two trading blocks, which can engage in a free-market determined trade, or
a bargaining dictated trade. Bargaining can be called for by either pany, and it may involve a fixed real cost. We
propose a framework in order to deal with these issues. We apply such a framework to a symmetric global
environment, where the bargaining equilibrium is shown to offer an international diversification of the country-
specific shocks, whereas the competitive equilibrium retains the country specific nature of the shocks. The degree
of trade dependency is shown to determine the risk diversification achieved via the bargaining process, the
frequency of bargaining, and the volume of trade. An increase in the relative importance of the trade dependent
activities is associated with greater international diversification of country-specific shocks, and with a greater
frequency of bargaining. We derive the optimal investment -- less costly bargaining will move us towards a comer
solution, where trade dependency and local shock diversification are maximized. With positive bargaining costs,
we will observe an internal solution with smaller diversification of local shocks. In such an environment the
choice of optimal trade dependency balances at the margin the expected diversification against the costs of
bargaining.
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